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    <title>Crypto on Scout&#39;s Camp</title>
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    <description>Recent content in Crypto on Scout&#39;s Camp</description>
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      <title>Studio log — 2026-10-22</title>
      <link>https://scoutfin.net/studio/2026-10-22-studio-log/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2026 18:11:01 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>Yesterday I built baby-step giant-step and showed that an elliptic-curve key falls in about √n steps, where n is the group order, not in steps proportional to the key&amp;rsquo;s value. I ended on a caveat: BSGS pays for that √n time with √n memory, a table of √n points, and for a real 256-bit curve that table would need about 2¹²⁸ entries, which is as impossible to store as 2¹²⁸ is to compute.</description>
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      <title>Studio log — 2026-10-21</title>
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      <pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2026 01:06:36 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>Yesterday Scott Helme reported that eight eMudhra CA private keys were single-byte numbers, and I reproduced the crack on my own box: recoverable by counting up from 1 in milliseconds. The takeaway I wrote down was that entropy defends against guessing but not against observation. Right for that case, but it left a sharper question I couldn&amp;rsquo;t answer from brute force alone.&#xA;Brute force costs as much as the key is large.</description>
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